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Abstract
This paper explores a novel philosophy of ethical care in the face of burgeoning biomedical
technologies. I respond to a serious challenge facing traditional bioethics with its roots in analytic
philosophy. The hallmarks of these traditional approaches are reason and autonomy, founded on a
belief in the liberal humanist subject. In recent years, however, there have been mounting
challenges to this view of human subjectivity, emerging from poststructuralist critiques, such as
Michel Foucault's, but increasingly also as a result of advances in biotechnology itself. In the face of
these developments, I argue that the theoretical relevance and practical application of mainstream
bioethics is increasingly under strain. Traditionalists will undoubtedly resist. Together, professional
philosopher-bioethicists, public health policymakers, and the global commercial healthcare industry
tend to respond conservatively by shoring up the liberal humanist subject as the foundation for
medical ethics and consumer decision-making, appealing to the familiar tropes of reason, autonomy,
and freedom.
I argue for a different approach to bioethics, and work towards a new way to conceive of ethical
relations in healthcare – one that does not presume a sovereign subject as the basis of dignity,
personhood or democracy. Instead, I am critical of the narrow instantiations of reason, autonomy,
and freedom, which, more recently, have been co-opted by a troubling neo-liberal politics of the
self. Thus, I am critical of current trends in medical ethics, often running in tandem with corporate-
governmental models of efficiency, accountability, and so-called evidence-based best practices. As
an example of such market-driven conceptions of subjectivity, I discuss the paradigm of "self-care."
Self-care shores up the traditional view of the self as a free agent. In this sense, self-care is looked
upon favourably by mainstream bioethics in its focus on autonomy, while healthcare policy
endorses this model for ideological and economic reasons. To contrast this, I propose a different
model of care together with a different model of selfhood. Here I develop and apply Foucault's late
work on the "care of the self." In this understanding of "care," I suggest that we might work towards
an ethical self that is more commensurable both with recent theoretical views on subjectivity and
– more pressingly – with the challenges of emergent biotechnologies. I end this paper with a
discussion on ethical parenthood, which offers a practical reading of the "care of the self" in relation
to new reproductive technologies (NRTs).
Published: 4 May 2007
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 doi:10.1186/1747-5341-2-6
Received: 13 December 2006
Accepted: 4 May 2007
This article is available from: http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
© 2007 Murray; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
Page 2 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
Background: questioning the good life
"The unexamined life is not worth living" [1].
While this essay focuses specifically on our changing sense
of self in relation to recent advances in biomedical tech-
nologies, in the background looms a larger, more philo-
sophical, question concerning life – bios: What lives are
worth living, what lives worth preserving and reproduc-
ing? Today, in a culture saturated by medical discourses of
all kinds, it is difficult to read Plato's remark on the value
of the "unexamined life" as anything but menacing. The
life worth living is the life that submits to examination –
"Like a patient etherised upon a table," as T. S. Eliot has
famously written. Michel Foucault captures for us this par-
ticularly modern sense of the examination: "The examina-
tion combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy
and those of a normalizing judgement" [2]. To "examine"
one's life today is to submit to medical knowledge and
techniques, to evaluations, and to normalizing judge-
ments. It is to be governed by so-called experts, and to be
understood in and through recent genomic and molecular
vocabularies of biomedicine. Indeed, these terms have
come to constitute our norms, and it is by virtue of such
terms that we can be said to be a "self" in any meaningful
way: these techniques of examination increasingly pro-
vide the very modes by which we reflect upon ourselves in
the quotidian, the modes by which we are tied to our own
recognizable identity, the modes by which we assign
meaning and value to life itself.
Medical discourse thus informs one manner in which the
self or subject is constituted – and silently comes effec-
tively to constitute itself as a subject. In this sense, medi-
cine operates as a "technology of the self," a nexus of
social, political, and historical practices and beliefs that
provide the very terms of the self and its self-understand-
ing. In Foucault's words, these "technologies" of the self:
permit individuals to effect by their own means, or
with the help of others, a certain number of operations
on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, per-
fection, or immortality. [3]
For Foucault, power bears directly upon the ways in which
the self relates to itself, including the kind of identity the
self can claim for itself as a "true" identity, and the kind of
self this self will strive to be in relation to itself and to oth-
ers. The self is never at peace, as it were; to be alive means
in some sense that the self is always cheating its mortality,
transforming itself, developing itself, and working to
understand itself; the self uncritically takes up the injunc
tion to be happy, pure, wise, perfect, or immortal, as
Foucault says. Stated simply, these are discursive modes of
self-relation, a sort of reflexivity that has become the cor-
nerstone of modern subjectivity. I shall argue that the
ways in which the self now relates to itself specifically as a
living, genomic organism have begun to alter the way we
conceive of the self. There has been a change, I believe,
because the terms and techniques of our self-relation are
ever more informed by emergent biotechnologies, espe-
cially through popularized genetic paradigms and new
reproductive technologies (NRTs). What Foucault
famously called the "clinical gaze" is fast being sup-
planted by the "molecular gaze" [4]; biopolitics – a poli-
tics concerned with the life of the population – is being
supplanted by "molecular politics" [5].
In this essay, I offer a discussion and a critique of current
genetic (or genomic) modes of selfhood, drawing in par-
ticular on the ways in which the self relates to itself, how
our self-knowledge is variously mediated by a rapidly
evolving biotechnological discourse. As a result, we must
ask: what relations will guide the ethical norms that
inform human political life, human dignity, and the com-
mon good, especially when these values have their roots
in a traditional humanism and liberalism that has come
under attack, in part thanks to these technologies them-
selves? I argue that human identity is fast becoming a mat-
ter of genomics, the identity of the self collapsed into its
genetic identity. It is increasingly difficult to identify –
even obliquely – an unalterable biological nature: bio-
technology promises to intervene at the most intimate
and elementary level of life itself. But more than discreetly
organ-izing  the body, biotechnology sets up the very
vocabulary in and through which all manner of "life" will
have social, cultural, and political significance, ultimately
determining the kind of experience we can have of our-
selves and of others as living beings whose lives have
value. Consequently, our socio-organic relationship to
ourselves and to others – and especially to our children –
is undergoing a profound transformation. More com-
plexly still, biotechnology is a burgeoning field of research
and practice, representing a vast industry spawned in part
by the Human Genome Project, including the manifold
interests of agribusiness, multinational pharmaceutical
corporations, reproductive and therapeutic medicine, and
even governmental agencies involved in all aspects of reg-
ulating human life, from insurance and public health pol-
icy to biological warfare and bioterrorism. Together, we
might call this the "biotech apparatus," the background or
lifeworld within which human relations unfold, are
understood, and can be valued.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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For the purposes of this essay, I shall limit myself to a brief
discussion of emerging biotechnologies that involve
genomic medicine and the biotechnological screening
and/or manipulation of the human body at the molecular
level. First, we might think of the woman who is geneti-
cally tested for the "breast cancer genes," BRCA1 or
BRCA2. From these tests, geneticists can offer her statistics
concerning her risk for developing breast cancer; and,
armed with these statistics, medical practitioners can sug-
gest therapies or strategies for "risk reduction" and self-
care. Here, the patient is placed in the impossible situa-
tion of having to imagine and relate to a future self, a sta-
tistical or actuarial self, a self that does not yet and might
never exist, in fact. As a second example, we might con-
sider how emerging reproductive medicine relies on a
similar rhetoric of "risk reduction" and "risk manage-
ment," coupled with the strange temporality of the not-
yet, the future baby, a spectre that looms larger than life.
Of these new reproductive technologies (NRTs), a para-
digm case is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), in
which the preembryo or blastocyst is genetically screened
for specific diseases. On the basis of these tests, scientists
and parents can then choose to implant only those preem-
bryos deemed to be genetically "normal."
The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon such rhetoric
in order to question the norms and constraints that gov-
ern self-formation in the context of emergent biotechnol-
ogies – norms that inform our human biological heritage
and the meaning of "the human" in general. Such a cri-
tique is increasingly difficult given what might be called
the genetic ideology that currently holds sway in Western
culture. As a point of interrogation, what will emerge in
this paper are two sharply contrasting models of "care."
The first I call "self-care," a model that has dominated
public health policy in recent years. "Self-care" relies on a
model of selfhood that is drawn from the tradition of lib-
eral humanism: the Enlightened, knowing self, the self
that is conceived as the source of its own agency, autono-
mous, free, and guided by conceptual reason. This is the
self that medical ethics typically presumes as founda-
tional: rational, autonomous, and freely able to consent.
In what follows, I am highly critical of this "self," and I am
equally suspicious of the evidence-based movement in
medicine and the so-called "best practice guidelines" that
have come to define "self-care" in the biomedical manage-
ment of this self [6-9]. In contradistinction, I shall pro-
pose a second model of care that I borrow from Foucault's
ethics – "care of the self." I hope to show how the
Foucaultian "care of the self" is incommensurate with the
care that we find in the "self-care" paradigm. In other
words, the model of selfhood that emerges in Foucault's
"care of the self" must be sharply distinguished from the
more traditional self of "self-care" conceived under the
aegis of liberal humanism. In both instances, while care is
the fundamental manner in which the self relates to itself
and to others, again, these two models of care are not
equivalent relations – each relation fosters a distinct kind
of self. Only the latter can sustain an ethical politics; only
the latter can help us once again to question the good life.
I proceed by offering a brief history of the emergence of
"self-care," and take pains to illustrate how its particular
conceptions of both "selfhood" and "care" have arisen. I
argue that emerging biomedical technologies pose a direct
threat to the sovereignty of the traditional "self," the self
that is bequeathed to us from liberal humanism. Genomic
technologies radically challenge our taken-for-granted
notion of a rational, autonomous, and free subject. I
therefore see the rhetoric of "self-care" as a response to
this crisis – an anxious effort to reinstate a rational, auton-
omous, and liberal subject both in the name of liberal
politics (e.g., through public heath policy) and in the
name of bioethics (represented by mainstream analytic
philosophy). These efforts notwithstanding, if this liberal
humanist subject is dead, then public policy wonks and
bioethicists are doing no more than offering life-support
to a corpse. Rather than endorse a philosophy of resurrec-
tion, we must instead work toward a new and revolution-
ary conception of the subject – one that would be
commensurate with the multiple effects and possibilities
of genomic technologies. This is not to invent a subject
who would wholeheartedly endorse all manner of bio-
technology; rather, it is to imagine a subject for whom
biotechnologies might be meaningful, a subject who
might enter the discourse of its own subjectivation.
Admittedly, this is a radical claim. If the traditional model
of the subject is dead – that is, if the familiar tropes of rea-
son, autonomy, and freedom are no longer taken for
granted as foundational, then political liberalism and
contemporary forms of Western statehood and govern-
ance will lose their hegemonic raison d'être. And this, too,
is becoming evident in the anxious governmental efforts
to conceptualize and contain both the practices and the
effects of new biomedical technologies (most spectacu-
larly, stem-cell research and cloning) – discourses and
practices that are transforming our conception of self.
Thus, we see the emergence of a "state science" and a
"state philosophy" on biogenetics. In the words of Slavoj
Žižek, this is "a philosophy that would, on the one hand,
condone scientific research and technical progress and, on
the other, contain its full impact, i.e., prevent it from pos-
ing a threat to the existing ethical coordinates" [10]. In the
face of these challenges, I turn to a Foucaultian "care of the
self," a form of ethical relation which suggests a different
model for both "care" and "selfhood." While Foucault
does not provide practical or material answers to the polit-
ical and philosophical challenges posed by biotechnol-
ogy, I believe the work from the last years of his life opensPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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for us a new and more promising discourse on the self, a
discourse that might offer more just and productive ways
to map our ethical and political coordinates in the genetic
age. This paper concludes by reflecting on the effects of
new reproductive technologies and on ethical parenthood
in general; I hope that this will provide one concrete
instance of how the "care of the self" might begin to take
shape.
The birth of medical morality: from the good life 
to the good self
"Everyone must discover that he is in a state of need,
that he needs to receive medication and assistance"
[11].
At this juncture an historical digression will be necessary
if we wish to understand the two senses of care that I am
proposing. In this section I shall begin with the historical
relationship that Foucault draws between medicine and
the self. Foucault charts the rise of medical technologies
and the emergence of the modern self, a self defined by
the modern liberal values of reason and autonomy. In my
own terms, this marks the rise of the self of "self-care" – a
paradigmatic self that experiences itself as responsible for
its own well-being, morally compelled always to act with
"due care" toward itself, morally obliged to avail itself of
new biotechnological "resources," and, lest he be per-
ceived as biting the hand that feeds him, to see these
"resources" as "empowering," if not "liberating." In a later
section I shall deal explicitly with the "care of the self" and
how this mode of care fosters a very different model of
selfhood.
Foucault's late study of medicine is found predominantly
in Volumes 2 and 3 of The History of Sexuality series, The
Use of Pleasure [12] and The Care of the Self [11], respec-
tively. His analysis deals mainly with medical technolo-
gies in the shift from Ancient Greece in the fourth century
BCE to the Golden Age of Rome, the first two centuries of
our era. More precisely, Foucault charts the historical shift
in the human relation to medical technologies, in part, as
one way to discuss what he sees as an increasing "prob-
lematization" of the self in antiquity (and with obvious
implications for the individuated self of modernity). For
the Greeks, there was no "problem of the self," properly
speaking: it would be wrong to speak of a Greek "self" in
the sense that we understand this term. Hence, medical
practices in Ancient Greece did not constellate around
individuated selves who would experience medicine as a
"subjective" intervention in one's health or as a "technol-
ogy of the self," as we do today. Instead, for the Greeks,
medicine was one instantiation of the technē tou biou, a
technē or "technology of life" – how to live and live well,
how to live the good life (the thrust of the Plato epigraph
on the "unexamined life," which fails to resonate in quite
the same way today). However, as Foucault demonstrates,
in the Roman period that succeeds classical Greece, this is
no longer an accurate description of medicine and the
medical experience: the relation is increasingly about the
technē of the self – in brief, a "technology of the self" that
is concerned primarily with how to be oneself, the good self
as opposed to the good life. Foucault summarizes: "I think
that one of the main evolutions in ancient culture has
been that this techne tou biou became more and more a
techne of the self" [13]. Or even more succinctly, he writes:
"I think that the great changes which occurred between
Greek society, Greek ethics, Greek morality, and how the
Christians viewed themselves are not in the [moral] code
[i.e., the prohibitions], but are in what I call the 'ethics,'
which is the relation to oneself" [13].
What I find remarkable about Foucault's historical study
is how it reads today. The reader is invited to read a "his-
tory of the present" into Foucault's discussion. Our age of
obsessive individualism cannot but resonate with the
descriptions that Foucault offers of Roman culture, while
our experience fails to resonate with the Greek. Whether
we are in ancient Rome or in the modern West, the indi-
viduals of each epoch are, each in their own way, in thrall
to medical technologies as a defining truth of the self, an
answer to the problem of the self – a self which silently
asks the question of itself and whose very asking is itself a
technē, a mode by which the self defines itself. And so
while for the Greeks, the question was how to live and live
well, for Rome – and for us – life is no longer the "ethical
substance" or the fundamental question, but selfhood is
that substance. Note the way the self operates as a trope in
Foucault's discussion of Roman medicine: "medicine was
not conceived simply as a technique of intervention, rely-
ing, in cases of illness, on remedies and operations. It was
also supposed to define, in the form of a corpus of knowl-
edge and rules, a way of living, a reflective mode of relation
to oneself, to one's body, to food, to wakefulness and sleep, to
the various activities, and to the environment" [11] (emphasis
mine). This remains a compelling description of medicine
and subjectivity today.
What emerges from Foucault's study of medicine in antiq-
uity is that since Roman times medical technologies have
been used as a way for the self to work on itself. For the
ancients, medicine was a solution to a certain ethical
problem of the self, one answer to those social and polit-
ical questions that an emergent self began to pose. Medi-
cine was one "place," as it were, where that self was
elaborated, literally worked-out, when it asked questions
about itself and its proper relation to family members
and, more broadly, to society. Medicine began to offer a
technical means by which the self would relate to itself,
prescribing techniques by which that self would be recog-
nized, would experience itself, as the good self. MedicinePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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was therefore a novel aesthetics of existence, one way to
break free of past modes of subjectivation, again, by pro-
moting "a way of living, a reflective mode of relation to
oneself, to one's body, to food, to wakefulness and sleep,
to the various activities, and to the environment" [11]. In
Rome, we might say that medicine freed the self. But
today, I would argue, we stand in an opposite – and very
much more sinister – relation to medical technologies.
Stated in the most polemical terms, modern medicine
does not liberate the self – it enslaves it. Today, medicine
has become part of the problem  of the self, and this
becomes even more obvious in our genomic era of medi-
cine: who or what am I if I am first and foremost a genetic
self; what ethico-political responsibilities do I have to
myself, to others, and to my offspring within this para-
digm; and what subjective agency is left to me if the sov-
ereignty of the Kantian "I" is displaced from a rational,
autonomous self onto a sovereign genetic code that has
the first and last word on who I am, what I am, and on
who and what I shall become? These are the new prob-
lems of the self in a genocentric age. Because genomic
vocabularies have so pervaded the public sphere, it is
impossible not to understand the self as a problem in
these terms:
DNA in popular culture functions, in many respects,
as a secular equivalent of the Christian soul. Inde-
pendent of the body, DNA appears to be immortal.
Fundamental to identity, DNA seems to explain indi-
vidual differences, moral order, and human fate. Inca-
pable of deceiving, DNA seems to be the locus of the
true self, therefore relevant to the problems of per-
sonal authenticity posed by a culture in which the
"fashioned self" is the body manipulated and adorned
with the intent to mislead. [14]
If DNA is nothing more than code, a "blueprint" or – bet-
ter still – a "command" structure for the construction of
protein molecules that, in turn, will shape who and what
I am, we might well wonder: Who or what commands
these commands? Where is the locus of agency? Where is
selfhood or subjectivity if, according to the liberal tradi-
tion, it is conceived of as agency or autonomy (auto +
nomos), the capacity to do or to act independently? After
all, I cannot be free from my genes. "I" am no longer the
source, the foundation of my self. At most, I can respond to
my genes, after-the-fact. So, if selfhood or subjectivity are
traditionally celebrated as the self's capacity to reflect
upon itself, this self-reflexivity is now thoroughly under-
mined by our genes; the richness of subjectivity is dis-
placed by, or, at the very least, dependent upon, the
mechanistic world of the gene, a world governed by infor-
mation, and not by thought.
While we are thoroughly beholden to the terms of mod-
ern medicine, and while the self is interpellated as a sub-
ject of medical authority, medicine continues to sell itself
as "self"-empowering. We are still told that medicine is
the cure to the problem of the self, the principal technol-
ogy by which the self ought to relate to itself, through the
body, through our relation with others (infectious dis-
eases), from the minutiae of our sexual lives (STDs, infer-
tility, healthy and happy sex lives, longer and harder
erections...), to our "lifestyle" or habits of eating, drink-
ing, smoking, exercise, self-care, and self-discipline. Med-
icine is now the problem of the self; and medicine, we are
told, is the necessary solution to the problem – a problem
that this medical discourse has in fact itself secretly pro-
duced and systematically obscured (e.g., consider the dis-
course on "obesity" and its re-packaging as "Metabolic
Syndrome"). If medicine is angelic in its promise, it saves
us on its own terms ("obesity" and "infertility" are now
diseases that medicine and pharmaceuticals promise to
"cure"). If anything, today an ethical project worthy of
that name would strive to formulate new relations to
medicine, new relations to the medical body, new rela-
tions to the soul that is constrained to think according to
biomedical terminology and to act by perpetuating a
medicinal ideology. But the modern self remains con-
strained by a medical morality: I am morally remiss, my
life is a life unworthy of living if I fail to submit to medical
examinations, to doctors' and psychiatrists' recommenda-
tions, and to proactively minimize my risky behaviours
and states-of-mind. I am subject to medico-moral judge-
ment if I fail to exercise "due care," if I neglect my self, if I
do not live up to a level of self-care that is sanctioned by
medical authorities, government agencies, insurance com-
panies, employers, public health and occupational safety
standards, family, friends, and concerned passers-by,
who, with a glance, condemn me in my knowledge that
this cigarette or cocktail is bad for me and violates life
itself. As Novas and Rose comment, the rise of this kind of
pressure "reshapes prudence and obligation, in relation to
getting married, having children, pursuing a career and
organizing one's financial affairs" [15]. "My" health
becomes indistinguishable from "public health" or the
health of the population: the "individual" is "normalized"
and "regularized" by "a technology in which bodies are
replaced by general biological processes" [16]. Of course,
my "responsibilities" and very shape of these public moral
expectations will multiply and shift according to each new
biotechnological discovery. It is no longer adequate to fol-
low the Hippocratic principle of "doing no harm"; today
I must be proactive, I must do good, and consequently,
"for my own good" I must accept on authority what the
"good self" would do.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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The ideology of self-care
"Self-care is one of the pillars of health care reform in
Canada today. Most self-care is undertaken by people
independently of the involvement of health care pro-
fessionals" [17].
The Government of Canada's public health agency,
Health Canada, has defined self-care as follows: "Self-care
[is] defined as the decisions and actions taken by someone
who is facing a health problem in order to cope with it
and improve his or her health" [17]. This description is
found in an official policy paper. It is deceptive in its sim-
plicity. It constitutes the individual as the locus of decision
and action, reinforcing the ideal of the liberal subject so
dear to biomedical ethics and liberal politics alike. Self-
care presumes a rational, self-reflexive subject who is able
to give his or her full – and "informed" – consent. The
model relies on the principles of autonomy: either work
to raise these individuals to the point where they are self-
determining, or else presume them to be self-determining
and act in such a way that will prove consistent with this
presumption. The problem with the latter, of course, is
that these individuals are colonized by discursive models
of selfhood and agency that are not, strictly speaking, their
own. It is a form of hegemony. "Medical relations of
power require this entity, this 'autonomous self,' so that
the self-so-constituted can choose to assume a symmetri-
cally lower position in the therapeutic hierarchy for his or
her own good" [18].
So while it would appear that the self of self-care is a self
that relates to itself freely and transparently, with full
knowledge, what proponents of self-care do not say is that
this self-self relation is mediated and highly structured,
relying on a cadre of so-called experts and technicians,
deploying a vocabulary that is sometimes frightening,
alienating, and often incomprehensible. There is a "thera-
peutic hierarchy" that is in some sense inevitable, given
the remarkable advances in medical research and the lay-
person's inability to develop such expertise. And yet this
hierarchy is disavowed in favour of a self that is consti-
tuted as self-responsible. Responsibility is conceived in
economic or entrepreneurial terms [5,15,19]: I, as a
patient, am treated foremost as a client who employs
expert-providers in my own health care initiatives, to
improve my health, to work on my self as if I were not the
subject of my own well-being but an object in need of
repair or enhancement. Here, the self-self relation is
explicitly technologized, instrumentalized. The self relates
to itself as through a knowledge economy – I am respon-
sible to "know" my self biomedically, to take decisions
and perform "best practice" actions in the project of my
own well-being:
Responsibilization operates to individualize social
responsibility for managing the risks of biotechnol-
ogy. Increasingly, individuals are expected, not to dis-
cipline themselves, but to manage themselves and the
risks that they pose to the wider social good, through
accessing and mobilizing the resources and expertise
at their disposal in the genetic marketplace. [20]
If I fail to understand what certain risks might mean in
real terms, in the terms of my own life, then that failure is
somehow mine and mine alone.
But how, we might ask, is a woman expected to under-
stand a genetic test that "predicts" her to have a 28%
chance of dying of breast cancer in her lifetime? Suddenly,
she is no longer dealing with a "real" medical crisis, but
with a potential one. In this gesture, she is quantified,
reduced to a bare statistic [21]. Medicine can tell her noth-
ing of the value of her life. She will be at a loss to evaluate
the meaning of such personal risk, which she must now
assume as her own, in the context of her entire life – a life
whose value and duration are themselves impossible fac-
tors in the equation. She will be forced to make decisions
with unforeseeable consequences, to navigate the unnavi-
gable; every choice will have an existential valence. Even
when we oversimplify her decisions, they remain impos-
sible: should she or should she not undergo a prophylac-
tic mastectomy and hysterectomy? Or should she wait and
see, and try to live fully under the veil of terror that such a
diagnosis will carry with it? Sarah Lochlann Jain refers to
this state as "living in prognosis" – "the collision between
subjective life and objective death" [22]. In some ways, I
suspect that such a life will prove unliveable, now that a
positive value has been authoritatively assigned to her
risk, based on statistics derived from genetic testing, aver-
age life expectancy, typical patient outcomes, and so on.
Can we really speak of "informed choice" in this context?
Her agency and autonomy are surrendered not just to
medical authority, but to a future body-at-risk that is not
fully hers, not yet. She is a subject out of time, because
"prognostic time constantly anticipates a future" [22] that
may or may not include her. Where is her "I," that Kantian
locus of subjectivity and reason and truth? And "who" will
act, if she can at best react to the sovereignty of her ele-
mentary particles, to a future that is not yet and may never
be in quite this way?
Thus, while there is the ruse (or at least the spectral prom-
ise) of epistemic certitude in the rhetoric of self-care –
indeed, a promise of biomedical scientificity – self-care
fails to offer us anything like the good life and only inau-
gurates a self that, despite itself, can never be unequivo-
cally good, happy, pure, wise, perfect, or immortal. And
yet we strive all the more, wedded to our epistemological
worldview, where our own genetic matter is produced "asPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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a field of management and includes practices such as
mapping, testing, coding, banking, simulating, and repre-
senting" [20]. Despite this surveillance and perpetual self-
management, the rhetoric of autonomy and freedom car-
ries the day: it is our ideology, our mantra. We presume
the "autonomy of the self" because we cannot imagine an
alternative. And such "autonomy" is also the cornerstone
of political liberalism and the vast economies we have
built. This emphasis on the autonomous individual effec-
tively privatizes and depoliticizes what are properly social
and political effects, embodied historical effects whose
operational power is summarily masked and disavowed
by liberalism.
Challenging such autonomy, ethically or politically, is
bound to be met with great resistance. And so we continue
to have faith in a self we describe as "free" to choose for
itself, an indisputable source of its reason and will. More-
over, we glibly continue to conceive of our technologies as
rational extensions of our autonomy, "extensions of man"
in body and spirit – from medical technologies to weap-
ons of mass destruction. And to complete this circle, we
ardently believe that our technological developments
actually increase our choices and, synonymously, our free-
dom. Freedom, in this model, is naïve: the freedom to
choose, the freedom to exercise an "autonomy" that is
defined with so much circularity – to have maximum
choice, and to be free from norms and constraints when we
make choices, all the while ignorant of those norms and
constraints that inform our desires in the first place. Those
who understand freedom in this model tend to see free-
dom in neo-liberal or "free market" terms: for them, our
political freedom is no more than the quantity of choice
in our marketplace... fifty brands of shampoo, paper or
plastic at the checkout. And so, to conclude this section, I
argued above that the ethical basis of traditional liberal-
ism – founded on reason, autonomy, and freedom – has
been challenged and outstripped due to burgeoning bio-
technologies. In this section, I have argued that neo-liber-
alism founders for similar reasons; but in a more sinister
twist, we are invited to discover an ethics of neo-liberalism
in its presumed ethical neutrality – that is, neo-liberalism
pretends to be ethically neutral by recasting reason, auton-
omy, and freedom as parameters of an independently fair
and objectively equitable market. This, too, is a ruse, but
of greater magnitude [5,9,19].
"Care of the self"
Socrates: "No physician, in so far as he is a physician,
knows himself" (131a) [23].
Here I would like to propose a different model of freedom
and subjectivity, derived from Foucault's late work on eth-
ics as "care of the self." Indeed, I hope that this will open
us onto a different form of knowledge, a wisdom that is
less in thrall to the ruses of autonomy and epistemic cer-
tainty – a different mode by which the self will know
itself. "Care of the self" is one manner in which the self
relates to itself in such a way that the self is not collapsed
into the certitude of its genetic identity and what this iden-
tity might mean. I prefer to imagine the "care of the self"
as a self-self relation that is inventive and open, as a self
that questions the norms and constraints in and by which
that self is said to be a self in the first place. I see this inter-
vention as a critical move away from a model of "self-
care" and "the good self" toward a self that will be in a bet-
ter position to question the good life. "Care of the self" is
incommensurable with "self-care"; indeed, while "care of
the self" will not preclude our practises of "self-care," it is
a critical attitude that will question the norms and con-
straints of this movement.
In order to explain the "care of the self" in greater detail, I
will need to make a brief digression, to shift rhetorical reg-
isters somewhat, to de-familiarize our familiar and fixed
ideas on care and medicine. I would like to turn here to a
love scene, of sorts, which takes place between Socrates
and the young Alcibiades in Plato's dialogue by the same
name [23,24]. The dialogue opens with Socrates going to
Alcibiades, who, at the age of twenty, is about to enter a
career in politics. Alcibiades claims that he is well-pre-
pared to be a wise ruler of the Athenians, and Socrates
inquires how he knows this to be true. We might say that
Socrates asks Alcibiades by what norms and constraints he
will govern wisely, by what principles or rules (archai).
Importantly, Socrates demonstrates that it is not simply a
matter of applying a skill. Indeed, sets of particular skills
(technai) – whether they are medicine, shipbuilding, or
wrestling – will not be sufficient if one is to govern well.
Instead, Socrates says, first one must know oneself. If one
knows oneself, or so the argument goes, then one will
understand implicitly, tacitly, that the principles of pru-
dent self-governance apply equally well to the just govern-
ance of the city-state. In the early pages of the dialogue,
Socrates convinces poor Alcibiades, who is initially cocky
and prideful, that in fact he is quite ignorant and unwise
in these matters. Alcibiades's pride soon turns to despair.
What follows is a discussion on what it means to know
oneself and to govern wisely.
Significantly, the dialogue is not primarily concerned with
epistemological questions. Epistemology is about what
we know, and how it is that we know what we know, and
know it with certainty. This knowing self is the self of self-
care that I outlined above. Instead, the dialogue is con-
cerned with the Delphic inscription – Know thyself! –
which has been passed down to us as philosophy's origi-
nal motto. How, Socrates asks, can we know ourselves? In
Socrates's own words, "how can we come to know the self
itself [tropon eurethein auto tauto]" (129b)? It is a questionPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
Page 8 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
of how, rather than a question of what – a question of form
over content, and this is already a shift in rhetorical regis-
ters. The self or soul is not a "what," it is not some thing
among things, it is not some knowable content subject to
technology. Instead, as we shall learn, the self or soul is
itself the form that makes knowledge possible. The fasci-
nating question here is: in what way – how – does the self
know itself? How does it reflect upon itself? How does the
self relate to itself? What are the forms of such a relation?
Or what are the terms by which the self will relate to itself?
By "terms" here, I speak metaphorically: the self-self rela-
tion is mediated by terms that include words, images, con-
cepts, values, etc. that are in circulation in the culture. This
shift in approach from what to how – from content to form
– is tremendously difficult for us to conceive because we
moderns are trained to think propositionally, according
to a disinterested epistemology that weighs the truth or
falsity of some particular proposition or other. But Socra-
tes poses a more vital question.
Socrates tells Alcibiades that in order to know oneself, one
must attend to the self, in other words, one must take care
of the self – epimeleia heautou. Again, for the Greeks, knowl-
edge here must not be understood in the modern sense as
propositional or as referring to mental evidence. Recall
that for the Greeks there is not yet a sense of the "self" as
we understand it; the self is not yet individuated, not yet a
Cartesian, rational subject, not yet a source or origin of
subjectivity. Instead, this ancient "self" is vital and rela-
tional, a political self whose self-relations and knowledge
involve others originally: a self that is originally a relation.
Knowing oneself, according to Socrates, is a relation of
care, it is a spiritual practise, the form by which the self
reflects upon itself. In Foucault's discussion of the Alcibia-
des, he emphasizes that care is a practise: " [it is] both exer-
cise and meditation.... a number of actions exercised on
the self by the self, actions by which one takes responsibil-
ity for oneself and by which one changes, purifies, trans-
forms, and transfigures oneself" [25]. This means that the
self is not in the first instance an epistemological subject;
rather, the self is first and foremost a spiritual relation that
will be the basis of any possible epistemological truth.
One is what one does. In other words, the caring self-self
relation is here the condition of possibility for any epis-
temic knowledge whatsoever. The self must first prepare
itself spiritually for the reception of truth. This belief was
passed down and has informed Christian ascetic practises,
for example. Foucault formulates the self-self relation as a
question: the self must ask itself, "How must I transform
my own self so as to be able to have access to the truth"
[25]? So to repeat, the spiritual relation the self has to
itself will inform epistemological truths and falsities, not
the other way around – epistemology is not the founda-
tion of the self, as it has been since Descartes. This turns
modern Western philosophy and politics upside down.
To elaborate this relation of care, we must pay careful
attention to the text of Plato's Alcibiades. Here, the word
for "care" is epimeleia, and the Liddell-Scott Ancient Greek
Dictionary provides us with two definitions: (1) care for a
thing or attention paid to a thing: one popular translation
is "to take pains over" something; and (2) care under-
stood as a public charge or commission. So we can see that
care is a relation that is directed both within and without.
It is an ethical relation because it has everything to do with
one's ethos, with the way one lives one's life and conducts
oneself with respect to oneself, to others, and to the world
in general. It is about the good life, not the good self. And
it is worth noting that later in the Greek tradition, epime-
leia is often substituted with the word therapeuein, which
is the root of our own word "therapy." So, we are right to
read a therapeutic relation here, or even a nascent bioeth-
ics. It is the kind of relation typical of a living being who
is always in flux, temporally, and whose relations can
always be improved, and whose knowledge can always be
expanded.
In the Alcibiades, Socrates says that epimeleia – care – is the
art (technē) of "making better [veltion poiē]" (128b). It is
not a "technology" in the modern sense; that is, it is not a
technical tool to be used by the subject, but is part of that
subject's very comportment in the world. The relation is a
relation of poiesis, a relation of invention or creation. Care
of the self is therefore the kind of relation one has to one-
self when one takes pains, when one strives, when one
works to make oneself better, creatively. There is a strange
temporal ambivalence in the self-self relation: it has eve-
rything to do with the way Alcibiades comports himself
and how he will  comport himself. He must strive to
become wise, to become other than he is right now; the
self must recognize itself as somehow unwise in this
moment and as empowered to become wise. Socrates is
absolutely explicit: the skills that we use when caring for
particular things, that is, for our possessions – and even
our bodies, as the physician does – is not the same as the
art that we would use when caring for the self itself
(128d). This is why he says that the physician, in so far as
he is a physician, does not "know" himself. The physician
does not care for himself in this way. Socrates is suggesting
that care and knowledge go hand in hand here because in
order to care for something, and in order to "make it bet-
ter" through poiesis, we must first have intimate knowl-
edge of the "thing" in question (128e). Socrates says:
"Could we ever know what art makes the man himself bet-
ter [techne veltio poiei auton], if we were ignorant of what
we ourselves are" (128e)?
With this narrative, I am suggesting a different model for
selfhood than the self of modern medicine that knows
itself biomedically, technologically, instrumentally. This
different model for selfhood is not the knowing self ofPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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"self-care." So what "self" does the Delphic motto invoke
when it says: "Know thyself!"? And how is this knowing-
relation actually a caring-relation? In a fascinating pas-
sage, Socrates employs a visual/anatomical metaphor:
"suppose that," he says, "instead of speaking to a man,
[the Delphic inscription] said to the eye of one of us... 'See
thyself!' – how would we understand such advice"
(132d)? Poor Alcibiades is perplexed, but Socrates
explains: "an eye will see itself if it observes another eye
and looks at the best part of it, the part with which it can
see" (133a). In other words, the eye will not just see a
reflection of itself, nor will it simply see another eye it will
take as analogous to itself, but in the intertwining relation,
the eye will see itself seeing. The relation is more than sim-
ply reflective. Alcibiades suggests using a mirror, but Soc-
rates will have none of it. The relation is chiasmatic, as the
French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty would
say. It is a chiasmus because we cannot say – or see – with
certainty where the eye's seeing passes over into its being
seen: sight must become insight, and must comprehend
both aspects of seeing-seen. It is worth citing Merleau-
Ponty at length, here:
As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision (as is so
well indicated by the double meaning of the word) be
doubled with a complementary vision or with another
vision: myself seen from without, such as another
would see me, installed in the midst of the visible,
occupied in considering it from a certain spot.... [H]e
who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is pos-
sessed by it, unless he is of it. [26]
This is to say that sight is never in simple possession of its
object, but is possessed by it. Vision has a double sense.
There is a reciprocity or reversibility that cannot be com-
prehended by instrumental or technical reason alone.
Merleau-Ponty states that there is "a reversibility of the
seeing and the visible.... a reversibility [that is] always
imminent and never realized in fact" [26]. In other words,
there is never a factic coincidence, never a fusion between
the seeing and the visible or seen. There are, as it were, two
"selves," which mark the ambivalence of the human sub-
ject. There is no abstract seer here, but to see is to be part
of the visible itself: it is an immanent critique. Most
famously, Merleau-Ponty uses the sense of touch to
explain this phenomenon. When the left hand that
touches the right hand – traditionally, "subject" touching
"object" – it is impossible to say precisely when the left
hand ceases touching and the right hand ceases being-
touched; it is impossible to say when the relation reverses,
and the left hand starts being-touched and the right hand
starts to do the touching: "this reflection of the body upon
itself always miscarries at the last moment" [26]. As I sug-
gested, it is as if there are two "selves," and provocatively,
Merleau-Ponty proposes the image of the body's two lips
here (ses deux lèvres), full of erotic and verbal potential
(erroneously translated as "two laps") (English 136/
French 179).
With the "care of the self," I think we are justified in seeing
the self's relation with itself as similarly chiasmatic. Care
is not instrumental, it does not go in one direction, but is
already implicated in its return-to-self. The caring self
never quite coincides with itself: if it did, it would be a
machine, perhaps, and ethical questions might never arise
for it. The self coinciding with itself is the model of "self-
care," where there is a technical "care" that amounts to
uncritically following orders and "best practices." In con-
tradistinction, Socrates's metaphor of the eye and its rela-
tion to sight can easily be understood as a relation of care,
the "care of the self." A self will know itself only if it knows
another self, and knows the best part of that self, the part
by which it knows, the part that is wise. And such a knowl-
edge can only be comprehended through care or love.
Socrates's caring love is exemplary in this regard because
he loves Alcibiades for himself, Socrates's care is not instru-
mentalizable, not technical. Indeed, we must say that Soc-
rates cares for Alcibiades because he cares for Alcibiades's
care of himself – it is a relation of a relation. As Socrates
remarks: "Your lover is rather he who loves your soul"
(131c). Remember, Alcibiades is now twenty, and all his
lovers have fled because he is past his prime, unable to
serve instrumentally as a sexual or erotic object of satisfac-
tion.
My point in recounting the story of Alcibiades is to show
how the relation of the self to itself – auto to auto – cannot
be reduced to a technē, the way it is in the modern model
of self-care. Instead, I am suggesting that the "care of the
self" is the difficult promise of a new kind of ethics. We
have to be careful not to call this a "foundation." The self
relates to itself non-foundationally, non-substantially,
and in this respect, we might be justified to invoke Socra-
tes when he speaks of the "soul." The soul or "psyche" is
dynamic and without substance; it is neither body nor
mind, as these terms are traditionally understood; it is nei-
ther cognitive nor conceptual. Instead, we might call it a
rhetorical device for plotting the relation between the self
and itself, which includes the relation between the self
and the other whose love and wisdom helps to bring that
self into a caring proximity with itself.
Parental care: ethical and grotesque 
reproduction
"...the hysterization of women, which involved a thor-
ough medicalization of their bodies and sex, was car-
ried out in the name of the responsibility they owed to
the health of their children, the solidity of the family
institution, and the safeguarding of society" [27].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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Socrates's care is nurturing, much as we might hope to
find in the parental relation of love and care. In the space
remaining, I would like to turn now to the case of parental
care in order to offer a concrete instance of the two modes
of care that I have sketched and the two modes of selfhood
that are associated with them. I have argued for a shift in
subjectivity as a consequence of new medical technolo-
gies. Certainly, this is not new. Foucault famously argues
that at the end of the nineteenth century we began to
understand the self as somehow both medically and mor-
ally responsible not just for itself, but for its offspring.
Through medical technologies and burgeoning medical
and psychiatric knowledges of the day, the health of the
individual started to become a "public health" concern,
subject to the powers of an expanding medico-welfare
complex. "Whence the medical – but also political –
project of organizing a state management of marriages,
births, and life expectancies; sex and its fertility had to be
administered" [27]. Eugenics movements began to take
hold, and citizens became informed by a discourse on per-
version that helped to underpin eugenic concerns: indi-
viduals believed that "perversion" would result "in the
depletion of one's line of descent – rickets in the children,
the sterility of future generations" [27]. Unsurprisingly,
women's bodies were most frequently targeted, hysteri-
cized, and medicalized; women were constituted fore-
most as bodily selves, a self reduced to a womb, a self that
is responsible foremost to and for the future generations
she would bear as extensions of herself.
If these subjective effects have not changed since the late
nineteenth century, our biotechnological capacity to
affect ourselves and future generations most certainly has.
Foucault's argument must be updated with the genetic
vocabularies and the new reproductive technologies that
inform the self today. As Nikolas Rose has remarked:
Selfhood has become intrinsically somatic.... The new
genomic and molecular vocabularies of ourselves –
like earlier biomedical languages of intelligence, or
depression, or "hormones" – are being incorporated
within these relations of the somatic self to itself. [5]
The hysterization of the body has today been replaced by
the geneticization of the body. Indeed, although we
remain preoccupied by the spectre of "degenerescence"
[27], and although we experience a "biological responsi-
bility" [27] as citizens did at the turn of the last century, at
the turn of the twenty-first century the medico-political
project is expressed in genetic terms. The self understands
itself and its moral agency in terms of a genetic self, a self
whose bedrock of truth lies in its genes, its DNA. We are
responsible to promote the "good gene" (however this is
conceived in the current discourse) and we are irresponsi-
ble if we risk passing on the "bad gene." In some cases, we
are constituted as irresponsible if we do not do everything
in our power to eradicate the "bad gene," which includes
availing oneself of every possible technology to ensure the
health of the baby, of the next generation, and ultimately,
of the species [28].
As I mentioned above, critics have come to see genetic
medicine as part of a neo-liberal form of self-governance,
where the self is encouraged to think of itself as freely
relating to itself, much as an entrepreneur relates to her
enterprise. This is the self of self-care. The self here
becomes its own product, as it were – all the in the name
of "freedom," of course – and yet that self is nevertheless
increasingly beholden to a cadre of experts who provide
the terms by which that self will, consequently, "freely"
examine itself, work on itself, improve itself, and so on
[5,19,29-33]. If this is not sinister enough, I have a very
deep concern that, in the age of genomic medicine, this
neo-liberal model has also come to infect our conception
of parenthood. The issue is more complex than current
fears surrounding the genetic engineering of "designer
babies." Understandably, some might say, parents wish to
give their children opportunities that they themselves
never had: parents wish to provide the best environment
or culture, the best schools, the greatest number of oppor-
tunities for their children to succeed in life. And from a
genetic perspective, parents might "naturally" wish to pass
on "the best" of themselves to their offspring, preserving
what are culturally coded as "good genes" and eliminating
the "bad genes." Preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) is one reproductive technology that is making this
a reality.
I consider these technologies – this technological relation-
ship to one's children – as a form of "self-care," a self-
managing extension of the self that borders on the gro-
tesque. This is because the care of self-care is based on util-
ity, it is a utilitarian ethic, a medicalized self-relation that
is not freely defined by the self, but that is promoted and
constrained by the norms of the medical, insurance, and
pharmaceutical industries, by HMOs, and by models of
profit-sharing. Here, despite the outward appearance of
authentic and ethical care, we find that care is being rede-
fined – care comes to be normalized, disciplined, technol-
ogized. The self, while it appears to be relating ethically,
instead relies on the expert terms and "best practices" that
are defined by the industry.
Although I am wary of biotechnology and of an increas-
ingly state-administered biotech apparatus, I would like to
distinguish my position from bioconservative critics
whose aversion to biotechnology tends to be based on
"fundamental" – or often fundamentalist – truths. One
famous example of this position is Leon Kass, formerPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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Chairman of President George W. Bush's Council on
Bioethics. He writes:
Thanks to technology a woman could declare herself
free from the teleological meaning of her sexuality – as
free as a man appears to be from his. Her menstrual
cycle, since puberty a regular reminder of her natural
maternal destiny, is now anovulatory and directed
instead by her will and her medications, serving goals
only of pleasure and convenience.... [S]he has, wit-
tingly or not, begun to redefine the meaning of her
own womanliness. [34]
One problem with such a position, as I see it, is its claim
to express a foundational truth about human nature and
kinship, about what a woman is, and about her biological
destiny. Kass promotes fixed and unyielding terms in the
self's understanding of itself and in its social relations
more generally. Such social and political conservatism is
especially pernicious when its agenda is peddled under
the sovereign imprimatur of "Science." How are we meant
to understand terms like "maternal instinct" or "maternal
destiny"? Motherhood is not some biological or genetic
response to the stimulus of the small infant. My own posi-
tion is, I hope, more nuanced. I am wary of biotechnolo-
gies for reasons that stand opposed to most
bioconservative critics. While bioconservatives see bio-
technology as leading to a threatening proliferation of via-
ble social subjectivities, and while they militate against
such a proliferation, arguing for the value of traditional
kinship positions, among other things, I myself contend
that such a proliferation is essential to ethical life. I believe
we ought to promote many terms and values to be tested
and discussed. And so, on the face of it, my position
would perhaps commit me to endorsing biotechnologies
on the grounds that a proliferation of choices in the
genetic marketplace will actually increase the viable terms
by which a subject might live the good life. But this is not
always the case. Indeed, I fear that the promise of biotech-
nology carries with it a false promise of diversity. In prac-
tice, I fear that increased choice in, say, the genetic
marketplace may prove detrimental to truly progressive
social and political projects. Ultimately, a proliferation of
choices in the genetic marketplace will not unequivocally
result in greater social and political diversity, but may
instead result in more stringent norms, less diversity, and
greater intolerance of all forms of difference, genetic and
otherwise.
I believe that our neo-liberal culture of self-care, coupled
with an increase in NRTs, has begun to foster a grotesque
parental narcissism – a narcissism that was once merely
thought of as social or cultural, but today is potentially
genetic and irreversibly embodied. Within a neo-liberal
frame that privileges the entrepreneurial self, I worry that
parenthood will become just another project of parental
self-improvement. It is tempting only to reproduce "the
best" of oneself, to relate to oneself and to one's own
genetic productivity as a relation of improvement. This
vision is extreme, but the discourse that surrounds "good"
and "bad" genes promotes rigid norms of acceptability –
norms that define in advance what life is worthy of life,
what life worthy of our love. In this model, I as a parent
do not just hope for a child whom I will love; rather, I self-
ishly want a child I can love, a child who is worthy of my
love. Within this rubric, we see our practical understand-
ing of care shifting toward a narcissistic self-care that is
invisibly governed by disciplinary norms, expert opinion,
and the ethic of self-improvement.
This is to suggest that the baby functions as a cultural
trope – literally, a turn, one mode by which the self turns
upon itself or relates to itself. In his 1914 essay, "On Nar-
cissism," Sigmund Freud argued that children were the
means by which parents might fulfil narcissistic desires,
effectively shaping their children in a particular image of
themselves, a working and workable extension of them-
selves. According to Freud, the parents' narcissism results
in "the compulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child
– which sober reflection would find no occasion to do"
[35]. The parent reproduces his or her own desires and
locates them in the child:
the child shall have a better time than his parents; he
shall not be subject to the necessities which they have
recognized as paramount in life. Illness, death, renun-
ciation of enjoyment, restrictions on his own will,
shall not touch him; the laws of nature and of society
shall be abrogated in his favour; he shall once more
really be the centre and core of creation – "His Majesty
the Baby", as we once fancied ourselves. The child
shall fulfil those wishful dreams of the parents which
they never carried out.... At the most touchy point in
the narcissistic system, the immortality of the ego,
which is so hard pressed by reality, security is achieved
by taking refuge in the child. Parental love, which is so
moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the
parents' narcissism born again.... [35]
I offer Freud's words as a rhetorical provocation. To be
sure, Freud's condemnation is polemical, and we might
well question the "nothing but..." in the last sentence
above. However, Freud does prompt us to think very seri-
ously about the ways we have come to understand our
children. Today we are acutely aware that we pass along
our genes; perhaps we are less aware that our desires are
bound up in them, but we would be wise to consider the
ways that genetic discourses contribute to modern forms
of narcissism. In the age of genomic medicine, Freud's
depiction has lost none of its trenchancy. NRTs, in shap-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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ing our understanding of parenthood, serve to facilitate
this narcissistic obsession with oneself, ostensibly in the
name of another. How often do we hear the moral com-
mand to act "for the sake of the children"? And at the
extreme, we will hear that the childless couple is "selfish,"
which belies the selfish narcissism of reproducing cou-
ples, as Freud understands it.
A more ethical stance might be to keep the baby as a trope
– a figure which is mobile and always open to revision
and redeployment, a kind of chiasmatic relation that is
not first conceived according to parental terms. In this
vein, we might succeed in further problematizing the par-
ent-child relation, which is one effect of Freud's text. Bear-
ing this text in mind, we might resist the appeal of a
"genetic narcissism," the urge to understand our children
as biological products whose bio-genetic makeup is now
subject to our manipulation and desires. We must beware
lest these manipulations and desires represent no more
than a technologically advanced narcissism in the Freud-
ian sense. And it is difficult to resist the implicit narcissism
that NRTs foster. In the name of science, in the name of
improvement, or even in the name of evolution, captured
by Richard Dawkins's [36] controversial notion of "the
selfish gene," we might be persuaded that our genes actu-
ally "want" us to make children in our own image, only
better, brighter, healthier, faster.... We turn away from the
wider implications of our choices: our responsibility to
our children trumps our responsibility for the wider social
and cultural effects that our choices may beget in some
unforeseeable future. We get swept up in what some have
called a "medical" or "reproductive fundamentalism"
[37,38]. "Evolutionary" biology ought not to be the pub-
lic face of – an apology for – what is essentially the preser-
vation or reproduction of a particular way of life, a
particular image of self, a particular social, economic, cul-
tural, racial, or political identity. Of course, the language
of the gene serves, conveniently, to mask these other real-
ities.
To be clear, this is not a negative judgement on those par-
ents who opt for genetic screening, for those who abort a
foetus on genetic grounds, or those who use pre-implan-
tation technologies in the effort to conceive a healthy
child. Indeed, the burden of raising a congenitally sick or
disabled child would be more than many people could
reasonably bear – emotionally, socially, economically,
and so on. However, as I suggested above, I do worry that
with an increase in the availability and use of genetic
screening and pre-implantation technologies, the defini-
tion of healthy and acceptable human life will become
increasingly narrow. This is what Evelyn Fox Keller has
described as a "eugenics of normalcy" [39], where socially
unrealistic standards of normalcy put a new face on the
old eugenics. Eliminating risk is now regarded as a
(pre)parental duty, and while this project is promoted as
fulfilling a "due care" that is presumably "owed" in
advance to the foetus, it is not at all clear to me that this
care is not in some sense a perversion of ethical love and
care. Love, after all, involves risk. Love is a chiasmatic rela-
tion that is marked by uncertainty and by trust in the face
of uncertainty. Love is a relation to a future that cannot be
fully owned, controlled, anticipated. It is a promise of self
with no guarantee that I will be returned to myself in quite
the same terms. Regarding our children, then, an ethical
relation of care is a relation that fosters the child's own
development, encouraging a future that opens onto the
unforeseeable, a proliferation of new terms and new
modes by which that emerging self will relate to itself in
its own tentative ways.
There are unavoidable social and political dangers when
we presume to define parenthood in exclusively biologi-
cal or genetic terms. On this ground, for instance, some
critics argue against same-sex marriage and parenthood
because they believe a child's right to know and to be
raised by his or her biological parents is a right that super-
sedes adult rights – the rights of would-be parents, straight
or gay, fertile or infertile. This is Margaret Somerville's
position [40], who recently sparked protest at Toronto's
Ryerson University when she was awarded an honorary
Ph.D. in June 2006. Somerville problematically argues
"the case of the child," whom she imagines is born with
the desire both to know his or her biological parents and
to be raised by them. She claims this as the child's funda-
mental "right," based on "nature," biology, and even
genetics. Instead, I would see these desires as socio-histor-
ical conventions that take on a troubling authority when
they are wholly biologized. We might stop ourselves to
ask how it is that these imagined children's needs should
trump the rights of would-be parents. This position, when
taken to the extreme, will demand that we sacrifice the
health and well-being of the mother for the sake of the
child, whose sovereignty is constructed as sacred and ulti-
mate. Worse, reducing parenthood to the so-called needs
of the child – again, needs that Somerville describes as
biological and "natural" – actually abrogates true parental
responsibility in the name of performing some ideologi-
cal and perverse version of it.
I am advancing a different view of parenthood here, an
ethical view in which the child is cared for regardless of its
biological heritage or genetic makeup. Somerville's moral
position is clear: in the name of the child, we have a duty
to prevent a whole sub-class of humans she calls "genetic
orphans," whether these "orphans" are raised by same-sex
couples or have come into this world thanks to sperm or
ova donation or even adoption. But I fear that Somerville
misses the point, ethically. If it is true that children suffer
from "genetic orphanage," she never asks why: she pre-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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sumes it is biological rather than social, the effect of some
biological deviance rather than a social effect, for which
she, too, bears some degree of responsibility. Rather than
fetishizing genetic "rights," perhaps we ought to step back
and reassess what parenthood really means in the myriad
forms that it takes in our culture. Genetic essentialism too
narrowly defines – and too dangerously limits – the ethic
of care that we might hope to find in a good parent. I do
not discount the desire of the adopted child to "know" his
or her biological parents; however, I am critical of the
whole cultural machinery – Somerville included – that
overdetermines biological identity.
I am arguing here for a model of parental care based on
the Socratic and Foucaultian "care of the self." This is an
etho-political relation that ought not to be reduced to
biology and epistemic certitude. But it is important to take
pains to define how such a care will be realized. Several
critics have warned against the potential political abuses
of "care," suggesting that care "tends to be associated with
conventional understandings of the family and biological
connection" [41]. This is one way to impose a social and
political agenda; it is a technological model of care in
which "care" is never problematized, in part because a lib-
eral political subject is presumed, a subject that under-
stands care simply as an extension of his autonomy,
according to paradigms of "self-care." Indeed, while the
Canadian Royal Commission on NRTs was titled Proceed
with Care [42], its debate over whether NRTs should be
available to lesbians, for instance, belies the norms and
constrains implicit in what "care" ought to be, and who,
precisely, is deemed worthy or capable of caring in this
way. Similarly, many political theorists argue for an ethic
of care but nevertheless arrive at an impasse because they
see care as a technology, that is, as a social and institu-
tional practice [43,44]. I take issue with the sharp distinc-
tion between public and private in these arguments,
however. These critics see care as normative or prescriptive
– principles to be followed. For instance, Sevenhuijsen
claims that "all definitions of care contain normative
dimensions" [43]. But by the "care of the self," Foucault
helps us to depart from this normativity. For him, care is
a way of being-in-the-world, an attitude, a chiasmatic rela-
tion that constitutes the individual and the institution as
two separate poles whose positions rely on dynamic
power relations and norms that ought to be critiqued. Sev-
enhuijsen and Tronto erroneously start by presuming the
givenness of individual selves and institutions responsible
for our care; this is the model of "self-care" as I have
defined it. In contradistinction, Foucault does not pre-
sume such a givenness. Thus, rather than seeking to mel-
iorate these two poles – self and institution – we must
think in terms of the implicit power-relations that define
them and constitute them as "origins" in themselves. In a
way, the relation is more significant, and the poles, deriv-
ative. The ethical self does not exist as a pre-constituted
and self-contained, autonomous entity who would then
use care as a technology; instead, she is constituted in and
by her relations of care, where the relations inform the
terms of that self.
One example for a more progressive model of care – struc-
tured on what I would call the "care of the self" – is dis-
cussed by Sara Ruddick. Much like Foucault, Ruddick
understands care as open-ended, allowing for a prolifera-
tion of terms by which the self will relate to itself and to
others. If we care for our children ethically, Ruddick sug-
gests, then we will foster "conditions of respect for unpre-
dictable and as yet unimagined difference and variety
among and within people" [45]. This is an elaboration of
the social psychologist Carol Gilligan's [46] work. Inter-
estingly, Ruddick ultimately argues that such a model of
care has applicability for an international politics of
peace.
Conclusion: care and questioning the good life
Emerging biotechnologies are sure to have social, politi-
cal, and material effects the likes of which we have not yet
even begun to imagine. I have argued that one effect is the
death of traditional subjectivity, that is, the end of the
principle of autonomy, the end of the rational, post-
Enlightenment subject. Thanks in part to biotechnologies
that promise to shape our elementary particles (to invoke
the novelist Michel Houellebecq [47]), I believe that there
can be no wholesale return to the foundational discourse
of liberal humanism. While there may be good reasons to
finally abandon our commitment to the sovereign sub-
ject, including its neoliberal instantiations, the challenges
of biotechnology seem to make it inevitable. Whether we
choose to mourn or to celebrate (each according to his
politics), we cannot deny that this death leaves us quite
without an adequate lexicon to understand political
agency and without a traditional foundation for (biomed-
ical) ethics. For this reason, analytic philosophers and
public policy wonks alike have worked to reconstitute this
traditional subject. But despite their efforts, through such
movements as "self-care," increasingly we will find our-
selves without a discourse that is commensurable with the
new modes of subjectivity that are arising in tandem with
burgeoning biotechnologies. This calls for a thoroughgo-
ing reappraisal of subjective life and the etho-politics of
the subject.
The "care of the self," as I have been sketching it, might be
one way to begin to move beyond such an aporia, toward
a different discourse on subjectivity – one that does not
anxiously attempt to reinstate a sovereign, autonomous,
and rational agent. To be clear, "care of the self" should be
seen as a social and political project that does not con-
demn new genomic technologies out of hand; instead, itPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/6
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would be a critical project that returns us to the question
of the self and the question of care in the pursuit of the
good life. In other words, it would vitalize the questioning
relation that the self has with itself, and it will look
beyond, to question the kinds of subjects that emergent
biotechnologies will inaugurate. It would refuse the abso-
lute identity and oneness of the questioning self. It would
keep this self-self relation open and dynamic – chiasmatic
– rather than closing it epistemically or morally through
reductionist genetic terminologies or other biotechnical
fundamentalisms. In effect, I am arguing that being-
human necessitates an ethical openness that biotechnolo-
gies – in many of their current discursive formulations at
least – threaten to close rhetorically. Thus, I tend to agree
with Heidegger and others who have argued that the real
threat of such technologies lies not in the physical destruc-
tion of humanity, but in what we might call its spiritual or
rhetorical dimension, an openness that is too easily closed
when we intervene in our elementary particles to manip-
ulate human physical and psychic features. Thus, the real
horror is not that something will go wrong with these
technologies, but that they will work too well. To cite
Žižek, the danger is, "precisely, that nothing will go wrong,
that genetic manipulations will function smoothly – at
this point, the circle will in a way be closed and the spe-
cific openness that characterizes being-human will be
abolished" [10].
This is not to deny that biotechnologies could, in fact, fos-
ter a rhetorical and ethical openness. To take the example
of NRTs, we might look to the ways that traditional kin-
ship norms have been challenged and new conceptions of
the family have emerged as a result. While these effects are
promising, I believe they are rare; more frequently, we
find a kind of operational bad faith in which biotechnol-
ogies are used instrumentally, and end up underwriting
the fiction of a sovereign, rational, and autonomous sub-
ject. This is disastrous because such a fiction – surely
hubristic – will blind us to the wider effects of our actions.
Better, then, to proceed with an avowed unknowingness,
rather than with the certainty of epistemic and moral clo-
sure that so often accompanies Science.
In brief, I am calling for a renewed discourse on the mean-
ing of ethics and politics in the genomic age. What class of
genes, what race, and what sexual orientation will be
reproduced? And according to what – and whose – ideol-
ogy of "the fittest"? Clearly, that which is reproduced
through biotechnology is never merely biological: will we
reproduce a horrific ideology or will we nurture an ethic
of care? How ought we to relate to ourselves and to each
other? How shall I understand my children, if the "truth"
of that child is, first and foremost, genetic? Will I seek to
pass on only my "best genes"? Would any less be less lov-
able? And why do I reproduce in the first place? Do I hope
for a child I will love, or do I want a child I can love, a child
worthy of my love, an image of myself, only better? What
are the risks, and isn't risk, too, part of our humanness?
When I love, am I not taking a risk, embarking on a rela-
tion that is open and inventive, unforeseeable and spon-
taneous, where I promise and there is no promise I will be
given back to myself in quite the same way? Care, like
love, ought to promote diversity. Rhetorically, it is a
polysemic relation that, in an ethical moment, cedes con-
trol, and fosters inventive relations between the self and
others, questioning normative constraints by allowing our
creations to signify in their own ways. This is how we
might define ethical parenthood: an ethic of trust, not to
contain, but to allow and to love the new. Despite the
temptation, promoted by traditional bioethics and public
policy, we cannot seek recourse in a foundational auton-
omy, in the principles of abstract reason or utility, or in a
self that uncritically does the bidding of those ideologies
we call family, nation, or race – however "naturalized" or
"biologized" these terms may become. An ethical care will
mobilize these as the tropes that they are, and seek new
relations, new modes, and new terms by which we might
once again ask the question of the good life. This is a call
for a renewed discourse that dwells not in identities but in
relations, not in DNA but on the ways it is socially and
politically and ethically constituted as meaningful.
I believe that we have arrived at a propitious moment in
human history – propitious and necessary – in which to
reopen the question of the self. Our technologies threaten
to outstrip our capacity to develop both an adequate
vocabulary and a liveable aesthetics of existence. What –
or who – is a self? And what ought it to be? What, exactly,
do we seek to reproduce in our use of NRTs? These ques-
tions engage the norms within which selfhood is circum-
scribed, the norms by which the self both governs itself
and is governed by others. With genetic manipulation, we
must ask whether the self becomes reified, essentialized,
thing-like, a product. After all, there is something haphaz-
ard and open-ended in the way the self relates to itself,
chiasmatically: this self-relation involves others, it is
inventive, it is a relation of difference, and it is therefore
political and historizing. Our self-relation is not an end-
less, and hence ahistorical, clone-like repetition of the
same. Ethical freedom requires a spontaneity-of-self. Is
the genetically manipulated child stripped of this free-
dom, rendered ghostly, lifeless? Freedom requires contin-
gency and a certain unknowingness, a risk, even a struggle;
human freedom is never fixed, always tentative; human
life is life because death is at the frontier, a historizing
event. The "care of the self" is, then, a response, but not a
response that must choose between the false binaries
acceptance/resistance, liberation/oppression, or nature/
technē. Instead, the "care of the self" inaugurates a self that
strives to open up a plurality of relations, a multiplicity ofPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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possibilities within which that self might relate caringly
not only to itself, but to those others in its care. To care, in
this respect, is to care for the care of others, to care for the
modes by which they might, one day, come to care them-
selves, and not just in caring for themselves. This is not just
a model of ethical parenthood, but an argument for ethi-
cal political relations, for the good life.
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